Spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into novel wild hosts in North America: A conceptual model for perpetuation of the pathogen by Franklin, Alan B. & Bevins, Sarah N.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
USDA National Wildlife Research Center - Staff 
Publications 
U.S. Department of Agriculture: Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service 
5-12-2020 
Spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into novel wild hosts in North America: A 
conceptual model for perpetuation of the pathogen 
Alan B. Franklin 
USDA National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, alan.b.franklin@usda.gov 
Sarah N. Bevins 
USDA National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/icwdm_usdanwrc 
 Part of the Natural Resources and Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Management and 
Policy Commons, Other Environmental Sciences Commons, Other Veterinary Medicine Commons, 
Population Biology Commons, Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology Commons, Veterinary Infectious Diseases 
Commons, Veterinary Microbiology and Immunobiology Commons, Veterinary Preventive Medicine, 
Epidemiology, and Public Health Commons, and the Zoology Commons 
Franklin, Alan B. and Bevins, Sarah N., "Spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into novel wild hosts in North America: A 
conceptual model for perpetuation of the pathogen" (2020). USDA National Wildlife Research Center - 
Staff Publications. 2346. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/icwdm_usdanwrc/2346 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Agriculture: Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in USDA National Wildlife Research Center - Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture       U.S. Government Publication  
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
Wildlife Services 
 
Spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into novel wild hosts in North America: A con-
ceptual model for perpetuation of the pathogen
Alan B. Franklin ⁎, Sarah N. Bevins
USDA National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, CO, United States of America
H I G H L I G H T S
• The pandemic of the novel coronavirus
SARS-CoV-2 likely originated from bats
or other wildlife species.
• We propose a conceptual model on
SARS-CoV-2 spillover from infected
humans to naive wildlife hosts in
North America.
• We hypothesize that SARS-CoV-2 is
transmitted via sewage into the natural
aquatic environment where wildlife be-
come infected.
• Wildlife surveillance near waste water
treatment plants would elucidate
whether SARS-CoV-2 has spilled over
into wildlife.
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There is evidence that the current outbreak of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, is of
animal origin. As with a number of zoonotic pathogens, there is a risk of spillover into novel hosts. Here, we pro-
pose a hypothesized conceptual model that illustrates the mechanism whereby the SARS-CoV-2 could spillover
from infected humans to naivewildlife hosts inNorth America. This proposedmodel is premised on transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 from human feces throughmunicipal wastewater treatment plants into the natural aquatic envi-
ronment where potential wildlife hosts become infected.We use the existing literature on human coronaviruses,
including SARS CoV, to support the potential pathways and mechanisms in the conceptual model. Although we
focus on North America, our conceptual model could apply to other parts of the globe as well.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
As with SARS and MERS, the recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus
(COVID-19) is suspected to have a wildlife origin, with likely ultimate
origins in a bat species and possibly with more proximal origins from
an intermediate animal host (Ji et al., 2020). With the global spread of
the virus among humans, we are concerned that this novel virus has
the potential to spillover from infected humans to native wildlife that
could subsequently serve as new reservoir hosts for the virus. In this
way, the virus may become entrenched in areas outside of its region
of origin and available for future outbreaks. However, for this to occur
there are a number of hurdles that the virus would need to overcome
to infect a novel wildlife host. Here, we propose a plausible mechanism
where SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen causing the disease COVID-19, could
spillover from infected humans into novel wildlife hosts in North
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America. We developed a conceptual model for this hypothesized
mechanism (Fig. 1), which we outlined as five premises supported
from the existing literature on shedding of coronaviruses by humans,
survivability of these viruses, and documented pathways for movement
of coronaviruses into the natural environment. Althoughwe focused on
North America, our conceptual model could also be applied to other
parts of the globe.
2. Infected people shed coronavirus in feces
For our conceptual model to be plausible, we assume that
coronaviruses can be shed in the feces of infected humans. This as-
sumption has been supported by research on other coronaviruses
(Yeo et al., 2020). For example, MERS coronavirus was detected in
14.6% and 2.4% of fecal and urine samples, respectively, from 37 in-
fected individuals (Corman et al., 2015), while SARS CoV was shed
in the feces of 56 infected individuals for a median of 27 days,
with 4 individuals shedding for over 100 days (Liu et al., 2004). In
addition, 38.4% of SARS-infected patients experienced diarrhea,
SARS-CoV RNA was detected in 16–73% of the stool samples, and
cultured from the small intestines of 5 patients (Leung et al.,
2003; Yeo et al., 2020). SARS-CoV also remained infectious in diar-
rheal fecal samples at room temperature for up to 4 days (Lai
et al., 2005). More recently, a U. S. patient with COVID-19 also
shed SARS-CoV-2 RNA in their stool (Holshue et al., 2020) while
SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in the feces of 59% of 96 infected pa-
tients for up to 31 days (Zheng et al., 2020). Thus, a portion of in-
fected humans are capable of shedding novel coronaviruses,
including SARS-CoV-2, in their feces, with some for extended (1–-
4 months) periods. Although there is uncertainty whether SARS-
CoV-2 remains infectious in feces, similar coronaviruses, such as
SARS-CoV, are infectious in feces, and ACE2 receptors for SARS-
CoV-2, are abundant in gastric, duodenal, and rectal epithelia cells
in humans (Xiao et al., 2020). This, coupled with the positive detec-
tion of SARS-CoV-2 RNA from feces in a large portion of infected pa-
tients (Wu et al., 2020b; Xiao et al., 2020; Zheng et al., 2020)
suggests that infectious SARS-CoV-2 virions are secreted from gas-
trointestinal cells into feces (Xiao et al., 2020).
3. Coronavirus survives in sewage and can be introduced into waste
water treatment plants
If fecal shedding is substantial in terms of number of infected indi-
viduals at focal locations, such as in hospitals, airports, or concentrated
housing, then substantial amounts of virus could be deposited into mu-
nicipal sewage systems (pathways 1 and 2 in Fig. 1). Human
coronaviruses (HCoV) can survive for extended periods in the environ-
ment, especially aqueous environments (Geller et al., 2012). Survival
rates of HCoV in saline ranged from 80 to 100% for 3 days and 30 to
55% for six days (Geller et al., 2012). Using two surrogate HCoVs for
SARS CoV, Casanova et al. (2009) found that the viruses remained infec-
tious in water and sewage for 17–22 days at 25 °C andwith b1 log10 re-
duction in infectivity at 4 °C. In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been
detected in untreated wastewater and sewage in sufficient quantities
to suggest testing of sewage frommunicipalities as a viable surveillance
strategy (Ahmed et al., 2020; Medema et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020a).
This suggests that water and sewage contaminated with SARS-CoV-2
is a potential vehicle for introduction into the environment, given it
can survive the waste water treatment process.
4. Coronavirus survives municipal waste treatment and is intro-
duced into the natural aquatic environment
OnceHCoV arrives atwastewater treatment plants (WWTP) in sew-
age (pathway 2 in Fig. 1), it needs tomaintain its infectivity through the
treatment process to be of concern in the effluent that is ultimately in-
troduced into the natural environment. In general, the transit time for
sewage to reach a WWTP is less than one day (Wigginton et al.,
2015). While WWTP do reduce virus levels, infective virus is still de-
tected in the effluent from these plants (Wigginton et al., 2015). Based
on metagenomics, coronaviruses were detected in 80% of the samples
from effluent class B sewage sludge from 5 WWTP in the U.S., which is
typically applied to agricultural lands as a soil amendment (Bibby and
Peccia, 2013). Although data is lacking for coronaviruses, wastewater
treatment prior to disinfection results in 0–2 log10 reduction of infective
enteroviruses and 2–N3-log reduction of infective adenoviruses, with
infectious virus still being detected in the final effluent from the waste
treatment process released into the environment (Simmons and
Fig. 1.Conceptualmodel of spillover of novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 into newwildlife hosts inNorth America and subsequent spillback into the human population. Numbered pathways
are described in the text.
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Xagoraraki, 2011; Wigginton et al., 2015). Thus, there is evidence that
infectious coronaviruses could pass through the wastewater treatment
process and enter natural aquatic systems via WWTP (pathway 3 in
Fig. 1).
Even if WWTP completely or mostly eliminated SARS-CoV-2 from
their effluent when they operated efficiently, there are numerous op-
portunities for SARS-CoV-2 to enter the aquatic environment through
periodic accidental spills of untreated waste from WWTPs. There are
two types of WWTP systems in the U.S. Combined sewer systems
(CSS) are the earliest WWTP constructed and collect sewage and
storm water runoff through a single pipe system while sanitary sewer
systems (SSS) are newer and are separate from municipal storm water
systems (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). Of the 14,194
WWTP in theU.S., 65.8% areCSS,whichare responsible for 850billiongal
of untreated waste being accidentally released each year; SSS are re-
sponsible for 3–10 billion gal of spills each year (U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004). Often, these spills coincide with extreme
events, such as severe storms. For example, 11 billion gal of untreated
(31.3%) and partially treated (68.7%) sewage was released from
WWTP into rivers and canals during Hurricane Sandy, mostly in New
York City and northern New Jersey (Kenward et al., 2013). Both of
these areas are currently experiencing massive COVID-19 outbreaks.
During the current COVID-19 pandemic, there have been large sewage
spills in outbreak areas. For example in February–March 2020, 16.1mil-
lion gal of sewage spilled in two separate accidents near Atlanta,
Georgia (Kelly, 2020) and 211 million gal of sewage was released in
multiple accidents near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Brasileiro, 2020).
Thus, accidental releases of untreated sewage into the environment
are an additional mechanism whereby infectious SARS-CoV-2 could be
released into nearby waterways.
5. Bats and other wildlife become infected with coronavirus by
drinking contaminated water in the natural environment
Although coronaviruses are assumed to lose infectivity in aquatic en-
vironments because of their lipid envelopes, the time for these viruses
to reach 90% inactivation (T90) varies considerably, depending on strain,
medium characteristics, and temperature (Wigginton et al., 2015). For
example, a swine coronavirus has a T90 of 4 days at 25 °C and 24 days
at 4 °C in wastewater (Casanova et al., 2009) while HCoV can survive
up to 588 days in filtered tap water at 4 °C (Gundy et al., 2009).
While, in some circumstances, coronaviruses released into natural bod-
ies of water may become too dilute for uptake bywildlife, there are two
mechanisms where dilution of coronavirus would be minimized. The
first are if effluent from WWTP is released into a relatively small body
of water. For example, one of the WWTP in Fort Collins, Colorado re-
leases its effluent into a slow moving, 8 m-wide irrigation canal that is
adjacent to a natural area. In addition, Medema et al. (2020) and Wu
et al. (2020a) found high titers of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in sewage at
WWTP in both the Netherlands and North America. While not defini-
tive, their results suggest that SARS-CoV-2 is measurable in waste
water. A second mechanism is possible bioaccumulation of
coronaviruses by molluscs and other aquatic organisms. For example;
clams have been found to bioaccumulate avian influenza viruses from
the surrounding water (Huyvaert et al., 2012).
Once released into natural aquatic systems, coronaviruses would be
available for uptake inwildlife hosts (pathway 4 in Fig. 1). Insectivorous
bats (order Chiroptera) are the logical reservoir host for COVID-19 in
North America because they were considered the reservoir host for
SARS CoV (Banerjee et al., 2019) and are suspected as a host, such as
Rhinolophus spp., for SARS-CoV-2 (Lu et al., 2020). In addition,
coronaviruses have been detected in feces of North American bats
with viral RNA prevalence in shed feces of 17–50%, depending on the
species of bat (Dominguez et al., 2007). Other North American wildlife
strongly associated with aquatic environments are raccoons (Procyon
lotor), which have also been infected with coronaviruses (Martin and
Zeidner, 1992). Interestingly, raccoons also feed on aquatic organisms,
such asmollusks, that are also potential candidates to bioaccumulate vi-
ruses. Based on experimental infections of domestic animals with SARS-
CoV-2 (Shi et al., 2020), otherwildlife species thatmay function aswild-
life hosts are cats (Felidae) and members of the family Mustelidae
(e.g., weasels, skunks, otters, mink, etc.). Examples of mustelids associ-
ated with aquatic systems in North America are river otters (Lontra
canadensis) and Americanmink (Neovison vison), whichmay react sim-
ilarly to SARS-CoV-2 as the domestic ferrets used in Shi et al. (2020).
However, bats remain the most likely species where spillover of
SARS-CoV-2might occur. Bats drinkdirectly fromnaturalwater sources,
such as lakes, ponds and slow-flowing streams and rivers, by swooping
over the water sources and lapping at the surface (Korine et al., 2016).
For some species, use of natural bodywaters was influenced by proxim-
ity to WWTP, where they increased their foraging activity downstream
from WWTP relative to upstream (Vaughan et al., 1996; Abbott et al.,
2009). This suggests a potential pathway for bats to become infected
with HCoV, and presumably SARS-CoV-2, from water sources contami-
nated with these pathogens from WWTP.
6. Coronavirus spills back from new wildlife hosts to humans
An important consideration in whether SARS-CoV-2 becomes
entrenched in North America through a wildlife host is whether
spillback from wildlife hosts to humans could occur (pathway 5 in
Fig. 1). Spillover into wildlife and subsequent spillback into the human
population represents an unmanaged source of SARS-CoV-2. For exam-
ple, if bats are considered the likely reservoir host for COVID-19,
spillback of coronaviruses in North America could occur where bats
use buildings for nocturnal roosts or hibernation sites and deposit
their feces where humans might encounter them, such as in attics of
residences (Voigt et al., 2016). North American bats have been shown
to shed coronaviruses in their feces, often at high (up to 50%) prevalence
(Dominguez et al., 2007). Airborne transmission of SARS CoV from
human fecal matter was considered the primary route of infection of
187 human cases in a housing complex (Yu et al., 2004), indicating
that aerosol transmission of HCoV from bat feces to humans is possible.
Although there is still considerable uncertainty about which wildlife
species can serve as reservoir hosts for SARS-CoV-2, current research on
domestic animals indicates potential candidates in wild cats and
mustelids (Shi et al., 2020). Because domestic cats can efficiently repli-
cate SARS-CoV-2 and transmit the virus to naïve cats (Shi et al., 2020),
domestic cats represent another mechanism for spillover transmission
from wild cats to humans. Another risk associated with the establish-
ment of SARS-CoV-2 in a wildlife host population is the potential for
mutation in novel hosts that results in a variant virus (Menachery
et al., 2017). Of particular concern, is whether there is the potential for
recombination of SARS-CoV-2with other bat coronaviruses should spill-
over of SARS-CoV-2 occur in bat populations.
7. Conclusions
While the primary risk associated with the current COVID-19 out-
break appears to be human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2,
we believe the existing evidence also supports the plausibility of novel
coronaviruses, such as SARS-CoV-2, spilling over to new wildlife hosts
through fecal shedding by infected humans and introduction to the nat-
ural aquatic environment via the waste water treatment system. In ad-
dition, we posit that spillback of novel coronaviruses from the new
wildlife hosts is also possible. Thus, considering the current COVID-19
pandemic,wastewater treatment plants and their surrounding environ-
ments should come under increased scrutiny for serving as potential
areas where spillover into wildlife hosts could occur. This was recently
conducted in the Netherlands where SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found in
sewage from WWTPs servicing 6 cities and an airport (Medema et al.,
2020). Such scrutiny could integrate surveillance of keywildlife species,
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such as bats and raccoons, which have the potential for acquiring
coronaviruses from their aquatic environments. An enhanced surveil-
lance program of identifying SARS-CoV-2 spillover into wildlife would
ideally involve 1) identifying “hotspot” municipalities with high
human caseloads of COVID-19, 2) identifying areas downstream from
WWTP effluent releases, and 3) sampling target wildlife species, such
as bats, mustelids, and raccoons, for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies and viral
presence. Such an effort could be conducted in conjunction with sam-
pling WWTP effluent as proposed by Medema et al. (2020).
At this stage, a probabilistic risk assessment model would probably
not be very informative because of the uncertainties of themechanisms
described here and the need to parameterize the pathways we propose.
For example, most detection of coronavirus in fecal and environmental
samples have focused on RNA detection through PCR and has, generally,
not documented infectivity. We argue that further research into our
proposed pathways is warranted, especially because outbreaks of
novel, zoonotic pathogens have epidemiological implications beyond
just human-to-human transmission.
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